

18 FEB 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

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Chairman, Special Task Force, DDA

FROM: [REDACTED]

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Executive Officer, OIS

SUBJECT: Special Task Force Comments -
Snow and Other EmergenciesDAMAGE ASSESSMENT

1. A survey of OIS Divisions has uncovered no personnel problems occurring on Friday, 11 February 1983, which can be corrected or prevented by Agency planning. Problems encountered by OIS personnel were created after they were dismissed from work and were incidental to local transportation problems--clogged roads, Metro buses altering routes without notice, canceled subway operations, etc. [REDACTED]

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2. The Agency decision to dismiss employees by 1000 hours, rather than later as in some Government departments, was appropriate and salvaged a situation that could have been much worse from the standpoint of persons in the Rosslyn area.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ROSSLYN

3. Task Force discussions did point out that more should be done to prevent a possible future problem in Rosslyn. The Fire and Safety organization can be used as the beginning and become the backbone to carry out an emergency plan.

4. As was pointed out, one person must have the responsibility and authority to "run the show." It is questionable that we need a Rosslyn Czar, but there is no question that one for Ames and one for Key, etc., is needed. The czar's name and phone number should be widely publicized (if not name, at least title and phone). A representative from each Office (component) in the building should be designated as an assistant and publicized with phone numbers.


5. These people should be trained in what resources to utilize in emergencies and how to activate this support. They should have keys (building, room, elevator, supplies) for quick access during emergencies. There should be a communication system available for team communication; there should be basic support food and medical supplies, cots, blankets, and electrical power.

6. The czar should have instructions as to where his/her team should gather for the command post operation (ground floor or other interior room location) and when and which local civil authorities to contact for support. The Ames "command and control" operation should be self-sufficient, although it must be coordinated with the centralized Agency operation at Headquarters where the ultimate control must rest.

7. Further, a practice exercise should be conducted once a year, as an educational project, and involve the czar and assistant czars plus selected "actors" located throughout the building. Each "actor" would play a role of a victim--burned, broken arm, heart trouble, frightened, stranded outside contractor, etc. Each would be selected ahead of time; each would have a written victim-scenario to follow; the exercise should be conducted realistically with some emergencies developing as slowly as weather emergencies do, while others could be sudden, as with terrorist activities or an explosion from accumulated gasoline vapors. (Ames Building is located adjacent to an Exxon service station.) The exercise should involve a small number of personnel so as to present a minimum disruption to normal activities in the building.

8. Analysis of the results of the exercise would provide information on where changes in procedures should be made, quantities of supplies should be adjusted, and possibly indicate when decisions should be made on early or delayed dismissal of employees, or other personnel action taken.

9. If nothing else, the contemplation of a plan should establish a "Commander" and his "Christmas tree" organization, a procedure to follow for various eventualities, and areas where emergency supplies and facilities must be improved. One additional facet necessary to make all of this effort worthwhile is to educate all employees where to go for help and to provide a roster of the emergency positions, area of responsibilities, and phone numbers of persons in authority.



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Bab:
you wanted it rough.
Here it is.



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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building Agency/Post)		17 Feb
1.		Initials Date 18 FEB 1963
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As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
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Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Bob
Good job!
Sam

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

14 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CPAS
FROM : Chief, Current Support Group
SUBJECT : Reflections on the Snow Emergency

1. Coping with an emergency situation of any sort reveals a lot about people, organizations, institutions, policies and procedures. Last weekend's snowstorm was no exception.

2. Since I had the "duty" (PDB/NID Review) on Friday, I was here and had a chance to observe, directly and indirectly, what transpired throughout the day and most of the night. What follows is what stuck in my mind, a sort of lessons learned.

CPAS Activities

3. Anticipation, good organization and good people (no priority order) are essential to any effective operation. Their value increases exponentially in times of emergency or crisis. And the greater the level of coordination, the more effect the response to any given situation.

4. Our 1030 (Friday) snow emergency staff planning session was critical to our coping with all the variables the rest of the day and night. Each component would have coped according to its own needs and SOPs, but it was so much better for all Office managers to have participated in the planning and known what everyone else was doing (and supposed to do).

5. The benefits of our "rehearsal" included:

a. Decisions were made regarding what was essential and what was not (e.g., the Watch, PDB/NID were alone in justifying personnel; all else was deferred).

-This led to significant economies of scale.

-Who could go, who had to stay and who needed to come in (to cover which 24-hour or other duties) was consciously determined.

-Priorities regarding care, feeding and transportation could then be established.

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b. The situation demanded (flowing from a. above) the assignment of a "Transportation Coordinator" to handle the logistics of transportation. ([] did an excellent job, but he became unnecessarily overburdened by non-CPAS demands--I will address this in more detail later.)

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-This resulted in allowing the Watch to continue its normal duties with only the expected extra administrative load.

-When it came time for [] to be "evacuated," we were fortunate to have two stranded individuals [] who continued the transportation coordination function through to Saturday morning.

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c. We knew who was where and thus I could make sure the transportation coordinator got all of our people out who wanted to go.

-The fact that the 1030 meeting revealed a sense of emergency organization and plan meant all CPAS employees could take comfort.

-Those who tried to leave but were forced to return knew where to go for help (or at least companionship). And all found some measure of assistance.

6. What should we do? We should institutionalize the procedures we practiced.

a. We need two dedicated 4-wheel drive vehicles to transport our watch and current pubs associated people so we can do "business as usual."

b. We need a transportation coordinator (and dedicated assistant) for at least 12-24 hours (at least both through initial hectic period, and perhaps one thereafter).

c. Each Group/Staff should have a central place which is always manned (phones) when people are here (and this should be made known to the Coordinator).

d. Each Group/Staff should have the equivalent of a military Recall Bill so that no one makes more than five calls and to ensure someone with authority to make decisions can be reached.

e. Since many in CPAS are involved in overnight activity, we should check regarding stocks of food and bedding (plus first aid gear). We also need to know who

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might have medical problems.

f. The types of things mentioned here could be pulled together by Admin, kept up-to-date, and a "package" of relevant info made available to the designated crisis coordinator.

g. Co-location near Ops Center not bad idea, but physical location here not too good since this turns the Watch into an answering service and the Center into a lounge.

Observations on Other Activities which Affected CPAS

7. From where I sat there was a good deal of confusion and (unnecessary) inconvenience to a lot of people.

a. There did not appear to be any other counterpart to our planning session before people started bailing out.

b. There is no real snow emergency (or any other) plan.

-What we (Agency) have doesn't address real needs, which are how we are to deal with

(1) People that are here or must be here.

(2) More importantly, with "refugees"

-I mentioned to you before that the snow emergency "plan" calls for transporting the wrong people!

c. Since we seemed to have our act together (and I guess because of general uncertainty about where an individual could go for help), the word got out that if anyone was stuck they should call the Ops Center (security guards told people this as they staggered back in after futile attempts to leave and asked what they should do).

-This caused [] to deal with a lot of plea:STAT for transportation he shouldn't have (individual requests, OMS medical emergency, etc.)

-This also caused the Ops Center to be inundated with calls and people.

d. Beyond transportation needs, there was no real coordination for care and feeding of those stranded.

-By about 1700 we found Security was seizing the lead on this (we called them frequently). They began to

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-survey the building

-arrange for (limited) bedding and K-rations
(it was found that GSI left the cupboards bare
in the cafeteria).

e. was closed but full.

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-We shut down the Watch and SOVA secured, but some cars were stuck and the contractor refused to plow, thus (unnecessarily) leaving a lot of people stuck who needn't have been.

-Only late in the game was a Logs Duty Officer contacted and arrangements made to get people out.

f. Plowing of our own parking lots was slow (they didn't really get to North Lot until after 2100).

-This caused unnecessary "refugees"

-Keeping the Parkway gate open certainly would have helped (the Parkway was in better shape than 123).

-I don't understand the philosophy that, in an emergency, the logistics and transportation flow patterns seem to be reduced--it would seem they should be enhanced.

g. It is not known (either by organizations or institutions) what the crisis and nerve centers are, and what they do.

h. Even within the Directorate, it would certainly have helped to know what the focal point for each component's activity is (one place, one phone (the individual secure phones are a pain in this regard) where you can reach everyone--a phone list (Recall Bill)).

-In this regard an event occurred later in the weekend which caused problems:

(1) The ADDI asked the Ops Center to pass a message to SOVA about Monday staffing.

(2) After a few initial calls, every SOVA manager was calling to tell the Center to call their people (it got so bad that the SIO told the Watch to cease and desist because they were neglecting their watch duties and there were important events which needed watching).

Some Suggestions?

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8. There needs to be an Agency Emergency Coordination Center (e.g. Security Office on 1st floor) where different coordinators (e.g. transportation, medical, food, clothing, security, etc.) can be located. Then all other components (whether they have "centers" also) will know where to go. //

9. Within each DI component there should be a designated focal point and there should be a phone list (Recall Bill). Thus if the DDI/ADDI wanted something, it could be passed to the Ops Center which, in turn, might need to call only one person (in each Office).

10. For use in any emergency, consideration should be given to installation of a speaker system (in each corridor, on each floor) which can be controlled by Security and used to announce emergency information (or even play a recording), e.g. cafeteria open; blankets being passed and out....

Conclusion

11. Within the Office our plan went well and everyone involved is to be commended. The larger picture, however, leaves me somewhat less comfortable. The people were good and willing, but there did not seem to be a clearly known, understood and coordinated SOP.

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18 February 1983

Note for DDA/MS

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Bob -

The following is the information on ODP you requested at the snow-emergency follow-up meeting held 15 February 1983.

o ODP Services - - There was no computer down-time or loss of applications availability attributable to the snow emergency and aftermath. The DDO, Ruffing and SAFE Computer Centers along with the Data Access Center (DAC), all located within Headquarters, and normally 24-hour operations, continued to provide services without interruption during the snow emergency. These facilities relied on reduced manning and extended working hours to provide the necessary coverage during the emergency. The ODP-manned remote centers, located outside Headquarters, closed at approximately 1030 am on Friday upon notification by the D/ODP, and reopened Monday morning. These centers do not normally provide primary support for operational applications and are not open in the evenings or weekends.

o Essential personnel - - Generally, within ODP, a function or duty is considered essential rather than a particular individual. Where applicable, ODP components maintain duty rosters of individuals for essential duties. The exception is the manning of the 24-hour computer centers and the DAC where the personnel from the current duty shift are considered essential personnel until relieved by the next shift. Although essential personnel remained on-site during the emergency period for IBM system repair (the availability of the IBM computer systems are considered essential to continuity of service during an emergency - alternate methods are available for other equipment) and for system software maintenance, their services were not required. However, several of the individuals that provided coverage for the computer centers and DAC through portions of the emergency were required to extend their normal tour of duty either by arriving at work earlier or extending their shift. A list of those individuals that spent exceptional hours at their post is currently being compiled by the ODP Executive Officer.

o The D/ODP notified ODP components at 1030 am Friday that non-essential personnel could leave. Those ODP people located outside Headquarters were able to leave work at that time and travel to their homes. The non-essential personnel that left the Headquarters complex between 1030 and 1130 am generally were able to travel to their homes. Most of those remaining after 1130 am Friday had to spend the night within the Headquarters building.

o Comments by the personnel, non-essential and also

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those on duty, on available services at Headquarters during the emergency were as follows:

- The undertermined closing policy for Government was the primary complaint. Most people felt that an announcement as early as late Thursday night would have been appropriate.

- Cots and blankets for the non-duty personnel were provided upon request.

- The non-availability of a method to advise individuals of services available within Headquarters during the emergency was mentioned by several people. Suggestions to implement telephone recorded message systems were brought forward by several individuals. This notifications system could also include a 'outside' number to keep individuals informed prior to the acutal emergency.

- The Cafeteria's hours of operation were questioned along with some comments on the C-rations. However, most comments on the overall experience were positive and complimentary.



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18 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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FROM:

SUBJECT: OMS' Snow Emergency Experience

1. What Happened:

A. OMS' combined staffing complement of full and part-time personnel at Headquarters, Ames, C of C and STAT is On 11 February people were on duty. SIAI

B. While we had a short-fall of 60% and 40% in personnel on Friday and Monday, respectively, all offices were manned and anything that had to be done got done - little else:

(1) Cable traffic was screened and action cables were distributed.

(2) Employees and applicants who showed up for physical evaluation were examined.

(3) A few patient cases were cared for.

C. By the time many of our people arrived at work on 11 February the decision had been made to release employees. Earlier arrivals spent much of their morning receiving the calls from their co-workers who couldn't get in or were stranded and sharing their experience with those who did get in to work.

2. What Were the Problems:

A. The Ames Medical facility (applicant medical processing) examined six applicants on the morning of 11 February. The staff remained on hand to do nine applicant examinations scheduled for the afternoon. At 1300 hours it was learned that these applicants were cancelled out at 1100 hours. Thus the staff had remained on duty three hours longer than necessary for lack of coordination.

B. Component crisis response phone chains were either not implemented or, in some cases, were not current.

C. While the Agency takes the position that all personnel are essential, many employees did not see this as a realistic policy, did not know the policy, or let their conscious or ego be their guide

SUBJECT: OMS' Snow Emergency Experience

D. Remaining problems were essentially of a personal nature, i.e., the necessity to abandon cars, personal expenses in towing charges and property damage to automobiles involved in accidents, and 5-7 hours travel time to get home. Several people were stranded in headquarters past 2200 hours and one spent the night. Others spent the night somewhere between Headquarters and home.

3. What Should Have Happened/What Should be Done in The Future:

A. The paramount needs are:

- (1) A realistic definition of what and who is essential.
- (2) Provision of transportation and, where necessary, 24-hour accommodation for essential people.
- (3) OMS internal and cross-office communications improvements; i.e, crisis response phone chains in OMS and, in such cases as applicant processing, information exchange among, OMS, OS, and OP.

B. Establish authority and under what circumstances applicant processing can be stopped.

C. Establish a system by which scheduled employees will know their physical examinations are cancelled.

D. In the event of one-two day weather emergencies, such as we have just experienced, it is our opinion that OMS can meet its responsibilities through our Duty Officer program:

- (1) Security Duty Office advise Medical Duty Officer of emergency situations.
- (2) MDO and ADO activate OMS crisis response chain-standby alert.
- (3) MDO and ADO be provided transportation to headquarters.
- (4) MDO/ADO assess situation and take appropriate action.
- (5) MDO/ADO will request transportation for only those employees who are absolutely essential to the emergency situation --in most cases week-end/holiday procedures will suffice.

E. Paragraph 3D above can be implemented as soon as paragraphs 3B and 3C are resolved.

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